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The Unconfirmable Modified
Chapter 13 Plan-the Disposable




The goal of filing a bankruptcy case under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code' is the successful completion of a confirmed chapter 13 plan, leading to
a discharge of the debtor. In order to be confirmed, the chapter 13 plan filed
by the debtor2 must satisfy the requirements set forth in § 1322(a),3 and may
include any of the provisions described in § 1322(b).4 Other provisions in
*Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. My thanks to Beth Applebaum for her
assistance on this article.
'Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978), codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1532 (referred to
herein as the "Code"). All sections referred to in this article are, unless otherwise specified, sections of the
Code. Chapter 13 is codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330.
2Only the debtor may file a plan under chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1321. The debtors who are
eligible to file for bankruptcy protection under chapter 13 are described in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
3Section 1322(a) states that the plan:
(1) shall provide for the submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other
future income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is
necessary for the execution of the plan;
(2) shall provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims enti-
tled to priority under section 507 of this title, unless the holder of a particular claim
agrees to a different treatment of such claim;
(3) if the plan classifies claims, shall provide the same treatment for each claim
within a particular class; and
(4) notwithstanding any other provision of this section, may provide for less than
full payment of all amounts owed for a claim entitled to priority under section
507(a)(1)(B) only if the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable
income for a 5-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under
the plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.
4Section 1322(b) states that:
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may-
(1) designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided in section 1122
of this title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated;
however, such plan may treat claims for a consumer debt of the debtor if an
individual is liable on such consumer debt with the debtor differently than
other unsecured claims;
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured
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§ 1322 also limit what may or must be in a chapter 13 plan.5 All of these
additional provisions (other than the one limiting the length of a chapter 13
plan) were added since the original enactment of the Code in 1978.6
A plan that complies with § 1322 must also satisfy the nine requirements
of § 1325(a) to be confirmed.7 In addition, if "the trustee or the holder of any
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal resi-
dence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders
of any class of claims;
(3) provide for the curing or waiving of any default;
(4) provide for payments on any unsecured claim to be made concurrently with
payments on any secured claim or any other unsecured claim;
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the curing of
any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the
case is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last pay-
ment is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due;
(6) provide for the payment of all or any part of any claim allowed under section
1305 of this title;
(7) subject to section 365 of this title, provide for the assumption, rejection, or
assignment of any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor not previ-
ously rejected under such section;
(8) provide for the payment of all or part of a claim against the debtor from
property of the estate or property of the debtor;
(9) provide for the vesting of property of the estate, on confirmation of the plan
or at a later time, in the debtor or in any other entity;
(10) provide for the payment of interest accruing after the date of the filing of
the petition on unsecured claims that are nondischargeable under section
1328(a), except that such interest may be paid only to the extent that the
debtor has disposable income available to pay such interest after making provi-
sion for full payment of all allowed claims; and
(11) include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with this title.
sSection 1322(c) permits defaults with respect to a lien on debtor's principal residence to be cured
pursuant to a chapter 13 plan until the residence is sold at a regularly-conducted foreclosure sale, and
states that if the last payment on the original payment schedule for a debt secured by the debtor's princi-
pal residence may be cured and maintained under § 1322(a)(5).
Section 1322(d) specifies the maximum length of the chapter 13 plan, which depends on whether the
current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor's spouse combined, when multiplied by twelve, is
less than the median family income for the applicable state for a family of the same size as that of the
debtor. If it is not less, the maximum length of the plan is five years; if it is less, the maximum length of the
plan is three years unless the court, for cause, approves a longer period not to exceed five years.
Section 1322(e) requires that the cure payments for defaults be determined in accordance with applica-
ble non-bankruptcy law.
Section 1322(f) forbids the material alteration of the terms of a loan from a pension plan, and states
that amounts required to make such loan payments do not constitute "disposable income" under § 1325.
'Subsections (c) and (e) of § 1322 were added by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (Oct. 22, 1994). Subsection (f) was added by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (Apr. 20, 2005). Subsection (d)
(formerly subsection (c)), was renumbered in 1994, and substantially amended in the 2005 amendments.
Subsections 1322(a)(4) and 1325(b)(10) were also added by the 2005 amendments.
"The nine requirements in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) are:
(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with the other applica-
ble provisions of this title;
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allowed unsecured claim objects to confirmation of the plan, then the court
may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan," the
chapter 13 plan meets the so-called disposable income test of § 1325(b).8
The disposable income test was added to § 1325 by the Bankruptcy Amend-
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or by the plan,
to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by
law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under
the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount
that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that-
(I) the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim until the ear-
lier of-
(aa) the payment of the underlying debt determined under nonbankruptcy
law; or
(bb) discharge under section 1328; and
(II) if the case under this chapter is dismissed or converted without comple-
tion of the plan, such lien shall also be retained by such holder to the extent
recognized by applicable nonbankruptcy law;
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distrib-
uted under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim; and
(iii) if-
(I) property to be distributed pursuant to this subsection is in the form
of periodic payments, such payments shall be in equal monthly amounts;
and
(II) the holder of the claim is secured by personal property, the amount
of such payments shall not be less than an amount sufficient to provide
to the holder of such claim adequate protection during the period of the
plan; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder;
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with
the plan;
(7) the action of the debtor in filing the petition was in good faith;
(8) the debtor has paid all amounts that are required to be paid under a domestic
support obligation and that first become payable after the date of the filing of the
petition if the debtor is required by a judicial or administrative order, or by statute,
to pay such domestic support obligation; and
(9) the debtor has filed all applicable Federal, State, and local tax returns as required
by section 1308.
For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the
creditor has a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt
was incurred within the 910-day period preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral
for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal
use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred
during the 1-year period preceding that filing.
'Section 1325(b) provides as follows:
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(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the
confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the
effective date of the plan -
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such
claim is not less than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be
received in the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first
payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured
creditors under the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term "disposable income" means current
monthly income received by the debtor (other than child support payments, foster
care payments, or disability payments for a dependent child made in accordance
with applicable nonbankruptcy law to the extent reasonably necessary to be ex-
pended for such child) less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended-
(A)(i) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor,
or for a domestic support obligation, that first becomes payable after the date the
petition is filed; and
(ii) for charitable contributions (that meet the definition of "charitable contri-
bution" under section 548(d)(3)) to a qualified religious or charitable entity or
organization (as defined in section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not to exceed 15
percent of gross income of the debtor for the year in which the contributions
are made; and
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures neces-
sary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business.
(3) Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph (2), other than subpara-
graph (A)(ii) of paragraph (2), shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and
(B) of section 707(b)(2), if the debtor has current monthly income, when multiplied by 12,
greater than-
(A) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of the
applicable State for 1 earner;
(B) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median
family income of the applicable State for a family of the same number or fewer individuals;
or
(C) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest median
family income of the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, plus $675 per
month for each individual in excess of 4.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the "applicable commitment period"-
(A) subject to subparagraph (B), shall be-
(i) 3 years; or
(ii) not less than 5 years, if the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor's
spouse combined, when multiplied by 12, is not less than-
(I) in the case of a debtor in a household of 1 person, the median family income of
the applicable State for I earner;
(II) in the case of a debtor in a household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest
median family income of the applicable State for a family of the same number or
fewer individuals; or
(III) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals, the highest
median family income of the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals,
plus $675 per month for each individual in excess of 4; and
(B) may be less than 3 or 5 years, whichever is applicable under subparagraph (A), but
only if the plan provides for payment in full of all allowed unsecured claims over a shorter
period.
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ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.9
A confirmed plan is binding on the debtor and the debtor's creditors.'0
However, after confirmation and before completion of the payments required
by the confirmed plan, the debtor's financial circumstances may change to
such an extent that either the debtor is no longer able to make the required
payments, or the debtor would be able to make payments in a higher amount
than the plan calls for. Section 1329(a) permits the debtor, the trustee or the
holder of an allowed unsecured claim to request modification of a confirmed
chapter 13 plan in certain limited ways." The modified plan must comply
with the requirements of §1329(c), which generally limits the duration of the
modified plan to that period applicable to the original plan under §1325(b)(1),
but in any event may not provide for payments for a period in excess of five
years from the first date on which payments were due.12 In addition, the
modified plan must, pursuant to § 1329(b)(1),'3 comply with "sections
1322(a), 1322(b), and 1323(c) of this title and the requirements of section
The dollar amounts included in § 1325(b)(3)(C) and § 1325(b)(4)(A)(ii)(III) are adjusted every three
years pursuant to §104, and the figures above reflect the figures as adjusted effective April 1, 2013.
'Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (July 10, 1984).
'0ol U.S.C. § 1327.
"The only modifications permitted under 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) are the following:
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class pro-
vided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments;
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is provided for by
the plan to the extent necessary to take account of any payment of such claim other
than under the plan; or
(4) reduce amounts to be paid under the plan by the actual amount expended by the
debtor to purchase health insurance for the debtor (and for any dependent of the
debtor if such dependent does not otherwise have health insurance coverage) if the
debtor documents the cost of such insurance and demonstrates that-
(A) such expenses are reasonable and necessary;
(B)(i) if the debtor previously paid for health insurance, the amount is not materi-
ally larger than the cost the debtor previously paid or the cost necessary to
maintain the lapsed policy; or
(ii) if the debtor did not have health insurance, the amount is not materially
larger than the reasonable cost that would be incurred by a debtor who
purchases health insurance, who has similar income, expenses, age, and health
status, and who lives in the same geographical location with the same number
of dependents who do not otherwise have health insurance coverage; and
(C) the amount is not otherwise allowed for purposes of determining disposable
income under section 1325(b) of this title; and upon request of any party in
interest, files proof that a health insurance policy was purchased.
12Section 1329(c) states that the modified plan "may not provide for payments over a period that
expires after the applicable commitment period under section 1325(b)(1)(B) after the time that the first
payment under the original confirmed plan was due, unless the court, for cause, approves a longer period,
but the court may not approve a period that expires after five years after such time."
"II U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1).
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
1325(a) of this title."'4
Notably absent from the list of sections applicable to a modified plan
under § 1329(b)(1) is any reference to the disposable income test of
§ 1325(b). As a result, most courts have concluded that a modified plan does
not have to provide that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to be
received during the applicable commitment period be applied to make pay-
ments to unsecured creditors under the modified plan. However, the absence
of specific statutory language requiring such application leaves open the ques-
tion of whether, based on other provisions contained in chapter 13, the test is
nevertheless required. In this article, I will first look at the cases analyzing
the issue of whether a modified chapter 13 plan must comply with the re-
quirements of § 1325(b), which are sharply divided in their conclusions. I
will then examine the legislative language and history of §§ 1329 and 1325,
from the time the disposable income test was first included in the Code
through the 2005 amendments to the Code that incorporated the means-
testing computations. Based on the legislative history, I assert that courts
should reach the conclusion that Congress intended the disposable income
test to apply throughout the duration of a chapter 13 plan. Finally, I will
provide my own interpretation of why courts have reached the contrary con-
clusion, and suggest that after the Supreme Court's decision in Hamilton v.
Lanning'5 there is no longer any reason to permit a modified chapter 13 plan
to be approved without satisfying all the requirements that would be neces-
sary if that plan had been presented for confirmation in the first instance.
Section 1329 should be interpreted to require that chapter 13 debtors devote
all of their projected disposable income to satisfy unsecured debts for the full
applicable commitment period to obtain modification of their chapter 13
plans.
I. INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 1329-TEXTUALISM,
INCORPORATION, AND OTHER THEORIES
As suggested by one of the leading treatises on chapter 13, "the interac-
tion of the disposable income test in § 1325(b) and the modification of plans
under § 1329 was not well conceived."16 On the one hand, the provisions of
§ 1329(a) that expressly permit the trustee or the holder of an allowed un-
secured claim to seek modification of a confirmed chapter 13 plan strongly
"411 U.S.C. § 1323(c) states that '[a]ny holder of a secured claim that has accepted or rejected the
plan is deemed to have accepted or rejected as the case may be, the plan as modified, unless the modifica-
tion provides for a change in the rights of such holder from what such rights were under the plan before
modification, and such holder changes such holder's previous acceptance or rejection."
"560 U.S. 505 (2010).
6Keith M. Lundin & William H. Brown, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY, 4TH EDITION, § 255.1, at ¶ 15,
Sec. Rev. June 15, 2004, www.Chl3online.com.
(Vol. 90432
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suggest that these parties may attempt to capture any increased disposable
income available to the debtor through plan modification. On the other hand,
§ 1329(b)(1), which lists the provisions of the Code applicable to any modifi-
cation of a chapter 13 plan, does not expressly include § 1325(b). Under that
subsection, if the trustee or any holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects
to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan, the plan must provide that all the
debtor's projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commit-
ment period-defined in § 1325(b)(4)-be applied to make payments to un-
secured creditors.
The issue of whether a modified chapter 13 plan has to comply with
§ 1325(b)17 has arisen in two contexts. First, can the debtor or the trustee
modify a confirmed plan to change the "applicable commitment period" from
that period specified in § 1325(b)(4)?18  Second, can a court approve a modi-
fied chapter 13 plan that does not comply with the projected disposable in-
come test of § 1325(b)(1)?i9 Ultimately, in both situations the issue is the
same-are the requirements of § 1325(b) applicable to plan modifications?20
'
7
There are also many cases that attempt to interpret the language requiring dedication of the debtor's
"projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period" to confirmation of a
chapter 13 plan in the first instance. Courts are divided over whether the language creates a temporal
requirement for plan duration or merely measures the amount of payments that must be made to unsecured
creditors over the life of the plan. Compare In re Flores, 735 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Baud v.
Carroll, 634 F.3d 327 (6th Cir. 2011); In re Tennyson, 611 F.3d 873, 879 (11th Cir. 2010); In re Freder-
ickson, 545 F.3d 652, 550 (8th Cir. 2008) (temporal requirement) with In re Burrell, No. 08-71716, 2009
WL 1851104, at *3-*5 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. June 29, 2009); Dehart v. Lopatka (In re Lopatka), 400 B.R. 433,
436-40 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2009) (requirement of minimum payments). If the court embraces the minimum
payments approach, a debtor who receives additional disposable income after plan confirmation could
modify the confirmed chapter 13 plan to reduce the duration of the plan and pay off creditors early even if
§ 1325(b) is applicable to plan modifications. Indeed, the right of the trustee and unsecured creditors to
seek modification of a confirmed plan to capture future disposable income is emphasized by those courts
that find the applicable commitment period to be a temporal requirement. See Baud, 634 F.3d at 356;
Tennyson, 611 F.3d at 879.
"Although there are many examples of debtors seeking to modify the applicable commitment period,
generally by reducing it from five years to a shorter period, see cases cited in note 20 infra, it is rare for the
trustee or a creditor to seek to extend the duration of a plan from three years to five years. See In re
Moglia, No. 11-35022, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 5197 (Bankr. D. Or. Dec. 30, 2014) (rejecting motion).
1
9 Other cases interpret the term "disposable income" in deciding whether property that the debtor
receives after confirmation of a chapter 13 plan is subject to the requirements of § 1325(b), even if that
provision applies to a plan modification, see, e.g., In re Burgie, 239 B.R. 406 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (assum-
ing without deciding that § 1325(b) applies to modification, but concluding that sale of homestead after
plan confirmation does not create disposable income); In re McCollum, 363 B.R. 789, 795 (E.D. La. 2007)
(affirming bankruptcy court's conclusion that proceeds from sale of home do not constitute disposable
income); In re Peebles, 500 B.R. 270, 279 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2013) (holding that post-confirmation inheri-
tance did not constitute disposable income); In re McAllister, 510 B.R. 409 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014) (find-
ing that § 1325(b), even if applicable to modifications, does not include proceeds from excluded property
as disposable income).
20
Although the legal issue is the same, the context in which the required modification arises definitely
leads to different results in the courts. When an above-median income debtor confirms a five-year plan and
then suffers a loss of income from the base amount used to determine "current monthly income" for pur-
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Most courts considering whether a modified plan must satisfy the re-
quirements of § 1325(b) have concluded that it does not. The most-fre-
quently cited reason for reaching that conclusion is textual: §1329(b)(1),
which itemizes the provisions that "apply" to any chapter 13 plan modifica-
tion, lists § 1325(a) but not § 1325(b).21 Applying the traditional Latin
maxim of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another),22 or simply noting that §1325(b) is not listed
among the applicable provisions,2 3 these courts conclude that Congress did
poses of the "applicable commitment period" in § 1325(b)(4), courts are reluctant to find that § 1325(b) is
applicable when the debtor proposes a plan modification to reduce the applicable commitment period to
less than five years. See, e.g., In re Runnels, No. 13-30084, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1597 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
May 11, 2015); In re Wills, No. 10-72120, 2014 WL 2442275 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. May 30, 2014); In re
Barnes, 506 B.R. 777 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014); In re Tibbs, 478 B.R. 458 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012); In re
Grutsch, 453 B.R. 420 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2011); In re Davis, 439 BR. 863 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); In re
Kearney, 439 B.R. 694 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2010); In re McCully, 398 B.R. 590 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008); In
re Hall, No. 06-61733, 2008 WL 2388628 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 11, 2008); In re White, 411 B.R. 268
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2008); In re Howell, No. 07-80365, 2007 WL 4124476, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. La. Nov. 19,
2007); In re Ewers, 366 BR. 139 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007); In re Ireland, 366 B.R. 27 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
2007). But see In re Buck, 443 B.R. 463 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010); In re King, 439 B.R. 129 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
2010); In re Clevenger, 430 B.R 539 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009).
But when a debtor receives unanticipated income and either proposes a modified plan that would
reduce the applicable commitment period through an early payoff, or objects to a plan modification pro-
posed by the trustee to capture the increased income, courts are more likely to conclude that § 1325(b)
should be applicable. See, e.g., Barbosa v. Solomon, 235 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2000); In re Williams, No. 09-
42400, 2014 WL 274307 (Bankr. D.NJ. Jan. 24, 2014); In re Carreiro, No. 11-17863, 2013 WL 2353784
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 30, 2013); In re Cormier, 478 B.R. 88 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012); In re Heideker, 455
B.R. 263 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Rhymaun, No. 11-20092, 2011 WL 9378787 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
Aug. 8, 2011); In re Heyward, 386 B.R. 919 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008); In re Baxter, 374 BR. 292 (Bankr.
M.D. Ala. 2007); In re Keller, 329 BR. 697 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2005); In re Carey, No. 02-75502, 2004 WL
3623505 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2004); In re DeFrehn, No. 02-20290, 2003 WL 25273838 (Bankr. D.
Idaho June 13, 2003); In Te Flaming, No. 02-033680, 2003 WL 22848925 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 10, 2003);
In re Martin, 232 B.R. 29 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999). But see Mattson v. Howe (In re Mattson), 468 B.R.
361 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012); DeHart v. Eckert (In re Eckert), 485 B.R. 77 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2013); In re
Hall, 442 BR. 754 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010).
2 1Section 1329(b)(1) states that "Sections 1322(a), 1322(b), and 1323(c) of this title and the require-
ments of section 1325(a) of this title apply to any modification under subsection (a) of this section."
"See, e.g., Neidich v. Lorenzo (In Te Lorenzo), No. 13-23100, 2014 WL 1877408, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May
9, 2014); In re Tibbs, 478 B.R. 458, 464 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012); In re Grutsch, 453 BR. 420, 425 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 2011); In re Davis, 439 B.R. 863, 867 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).
"See, e.g., Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 533 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dictum); Mattson v.
Howe (In re Mattson), 468 B.R. 361, 372-73 (B.AP. 9th Cir. 2012); Sunahara v. Burchard (In re
Sunahara), 326 B.R. 768, 781 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005); Forbes v. Forbes (In re Forbes), 215 B.R 183, 191
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997); King v. Robenhorst, No. 11-573, 2011 WL 5877081, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 23,
2011); In re McCollum, 363 B.R. 789, 798 (E.D. La. 2011); In re Runnels, No. 13-30084, 2015 Bankr.
LEXIS 1597, at *25-26 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. May 11, 2015); In re Moglia, No. 11-35022, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS
5197, at *4 (Bankr. D. Or. Dec. 30, 2014); In re Pautin, 521 BR. 754, 762 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2014); In re
Swain, 509 B.R. 22, 30 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014); In re Ramsey, 507 B.R. 736 739 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2014); In
ye Powers, 507 B.R. 262, 269 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Germeraad v. Powell,
No. 14-3129, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165920 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2014); In re Wills, No. 10-72120, 2014
WL 2442275, at *4 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. May 30, 2014); In re Barnes, 506 B.R. 777, 782 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
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not intend to make § 1325(b) applicable to chapter 13 plan modifications.
The second reason sometimes given by courts that decline to find
§ 1325(b) applicable to plan modifications is the way Congress referred to
§ 1325(a) in §1329(b)(1), as compared with the manner in which Congress
referred to other applicable sections. Under §1329(b)(1), Congress provided
that "Sections 1322(a), 1322(b) and 1323(c)" are applicable to chapter 13
plan modifications, but then added that "the requirements of Section 1325(a)"
are also applicable. Because compliance with § 1325(b) is not required under
§ 1325(a) unless either the trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to a plan,
these courts conclude that Congress intended to exclude § 1325(b) by using
the word "requirements" in § 1329(b)(1).24
Third, courts also note that § 1325(b) by its terms is triggered only "[i]f
the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confir-
mation of the plan."25 Because these courts maintain that a modified plan is
not subject to "confirmation," but only approval of the modification,
§ 1325(b) can never be applicable in that context.26
Fourth, if § 1325(b) (insofar as it specifies a required applicable commit-
2014); In re Tengan, No. 13-00225, 2014 WL 5306620, at *2 (Bankr. D. Haw. Oct. 15, 2014); In re
Salpietro, 492 B.R. 630, 637 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013); DeHart v. Eckert (In re Eckert), 485 B.R. 77, 82
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2013); In re Martin, No. 10-64790, 2010 WL 6196566, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 27,
2013); In re Hargis, No. 09-64398, 2013 WL 4514090, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2013); In re
Coay, No. 09-71814, 2012 WL 2319100, at *6 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. June 19, 2012); In re Crim, 445 B.R. 868,
871 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011); In re Hall, 442 B.R. 754, 760-61 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010); In re Prieto, No.
08-3308, 2010 WL 3959610, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 2010); In re Kearney, 439 B.R. 694, 696
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2010); In re McCully, 398 B.R 590, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008); In re Hall, No. 06-
61733, 2008 WL 2388628, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 11, 2008); In re White, 411 B.R. 268, 273
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2008); In re Hill, 386 B.R. 670, 676 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008); In re Wetzel, 381 B.R.
247, 251 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); In re Young, 370 B.R. 799, 802 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007); In re Ewers,
366 B.R 139, 142-43 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007); In re McPike, No. 05-30518, 2007 WL 2317420, at *2
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 8, 2007); Turek v. Dehart (In re Turek), 346 B.R. 350, 359 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2006);
In re Drew, 325 B.R. 765, 773 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); In re Golek, 308 B.R. 332, 336-37 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2004); In re Sounakhene, 249 B.R. 801, 805 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000); In re Coleman, 231 B.R 397, 401
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1999) (dictum); In re Anderson, 153 B.R. 527, 528 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1993); In re Moss,
91 B.R. 563, 566 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
24See, e.g., Lorenzo, 2014 WL 1877408, at *5; Pautin, 521 B.R. at 762; Tibbs, 478 B.R. at 464;
Grutsch, 453 B.R. at 425; Davis, 439 B.R. at 867. Indeed one court reads the introductory language of
§ 1325(a) ("Except as provide in subsection (b)") as excluding § 1325(b) from the confirmation require-
ments under chapter 13. See Sunahara, 326 B.R. at 781.
Other courts have rejected this argument, noting that, if the trustee or the holder of an allowed
unsecured claim objects to the plan, compliance with § 1325(b) is indeed a requirement for confirmation.
See, e.g., In re Cormier, 468 B.R. 88, 96 (D. Mass. 2012); In re Heideker, 455 B.R. 263, 269-70 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2011).
2511 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (emphasis supplied).
26See, e.g., Lorenzo, 2014 WL 1877408, at *5; Powers, 507 B.R. at 269; Coay, 2012 WL 2319100, at *5;
Davis, 439 B.R. at 866. But see In re Anderson, Nos. 587-03218, 587-03236, 1989 WL 222971, at * 5
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 1989) (stating that "modification under Section 1329 requires ... a new confir-
mation analysis" and that the proposed modifications must satisfy the requirements of Section 1325(b)).
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ment period) were applicable to modifications, some courts have suggested
that § 1329(a)(2) (which allows modifications to extend or reduce the time
for payments under the plan) would be rendered meaningless.27 Such a con-
clusion would violate the general precept of statutory interpretation that a
provision should not be interpreted in a way that renders other provisions
superfluous or unnecessary.28
Fifth, some courts maintain that since the 2005 amendments to the
Code29 it is technically impossible to apply § 1325(b)(1) to plan modifica-
tions because the section explicitly requires that, as of the effective date of
the plan, the plan must provide for application of the debtor's projected dis-
posable income to be received in the applicable commitment period beginning
on the date that the first payment is due under the plan to pay unsecured
creditors. "Disposable income" is defined in § 1325(b)(2) based on "current
monthly income," a term defined by reference to income actually received
prepetition.30 Therefore, these courts posit that the term "disposable in-
come" can never be increased to include postpetition income and, conse-
quently, neither can the term "projected disposable income."3 '
27See, e.g., In re Howell, No. 07-80365, 2007 WL 4124476, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. La. Nov. 19, 2007).
But see Williams, 2014 WL 274307, at *7; Cormier, 478 B.R. at 96; Heideker, 455 B.R. at 270 (noting that
even if above-median debtors could not modify their plans to reduce the applicable commitment period
unless unsecured creditors were paid in full if § 1325(b) were applicable, below-median debtors who had
previously confirmed plans of a duration longer than three years would be permitted under § 1329(a)(2) to
modify the plans to reduce the length of the plan).
2
8See, e.g., Ratzlafv. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655,659 (1994); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759,
778 (1988) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 510
n.22 (1986).
29
See discussion at notes 128-138 infra.
3011 U.S.C. § 101(10A) generally computes "current monthly income" based on the "average monthly
income from all sources that the debtor receives ... during the 6-month period ending on ... the last day of
the calendar month immediately preceding the date of the commencement of the case. . . ." Id.
§ 101(10A)(A)(i).
I"See In re McAllister, 510 B.R. 409, 418 & n.12 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014); Powers, 507 B.R. at 270; In
re Hargis, No. 09-64398, 2013 WL 4514090, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2013); In re Walker, No.
07-70358, 2010 WL 4259274, at * 9 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2010); In re York, 415 B.R. 377, 382 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 2009).
This analysis adopts a restrictive view of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the term "projected
disposable income" in Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505 (2010). The Court there stated that "projected
disposable income" must "account for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtu-
ally certain at the time of confirmation." Id. at 524 (emphasis supplied). Although the facts of that case
involved a debtor whose "disposable income" at the time of confirmation was substantially higher than his
actual ability to pay, the Court suggested that its forward-looking approach was also applicable "[ijn cases
in which a debtor's disposable income during the 6-month look-back period is either substantially lower or
higher than the debtor's disposable income during the plan period." Id. at 520 (emphasis supplied). There
is no reason to believe that the Court did not intend the forward-looking approach to be used in connec-
tion with a plan modification. Indeed, in Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N-A., 562 U.S. 61, 80 (2011), the
Supreme Court indicated that "[t]he appropriate way to account for unanticipated expenses . . . is to use
the method that the Code provides for all Chapter 13 debtors (and their creditors): modification of the
plan in light of changed circumstances."). If such modifications are permitted for unanticipated expenses,
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Finally, some courts state that, even if § 1325(b) could be read to apply
to a modification to a chapter 13 plan proposed by the debtor (to which the
trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim could object as provided
in § 1325(b)(1)), it cannot apply to a modification proposed by the trustee or
unsecured creditors.32 Of course, such a reading essentially makes § 1325(b)
inapplicable to any modified plan that proposes increased payments, because
such a proposal would rarely be made by a debtor.33
Instead of applying § 1325(b) to modified plans, many of those courts
consider the amount the debtor is proposing to devote to unsecured creditors
as a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether to approve the
they should also be allowed for unanticipated income. See also In re Peebles, 500 BR. 270, 275 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 2013) (stating that "[ilt is illogical and contrary to the plain language of § 1329 to suggest that a
post-confirmation 'windfall' of any kind, which would presumably always be excluded from the new defini-
tion of disposable income, cannot support a modification by the trustee").
A related argument some courts make relies on the language of § 1325(b)(1)(B), which measures the
beginning of the applicable commitment period for purposes of the disposable income test by the "date that
the first payment is due under the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (emphasis supplied). Because a modi-
fied plan becomes "the plan" under § 1329(b)(2), these courts-relying on a comment made by Judge
Lundin in his treatise, Keith M. Lundin & William H. Brown, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY, 4TH EDITION,
§ 255.1, at ¶ 14, Sec. Rev. June 15, 2004, www.Chl3online.com-conclude that applying the disposable
income test would necessarily preclude any modification of a confirmed plan later than the date that is two
years after the first date on which payments were due under the original confirmed plan. If the disposable
income test applied to plan modifications, these courts argue, the debtor would be required to devote all
disposable income for an "applicable commitment period" that begins "on the date that the first payment is
due under the [modified] plan." Because the "applicable commitment period" under § 1325(b)(4) can
never be shorter than three years, requiring compliance with the disposable income test upon plan modifi-
cation would create an irreconcilable conflict between the limit on the length of a modified plan in
§ 1329(c) (no more than five years from "the time that the first payment under the original confirmed plan
was due") and the the disposable income requirement in § 1325(b)(1)(B). Therefore, these courts conclude
that Congress did not intend for modified plans to be subject to § 1325(b). See, e.g., Forbes v. Forbes (In
re Forbes), 215 B.R. 183, 192 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997). Of course, if the reference to "the plan" in
§ 1325(b)(1)(B) is read to mean the original confirmed plan rather than the modified plan, there is no
inconsistency between the two sections.
"See, e.g., Max Recovery, Inc. v. Than (In re Than), 215 B.R. 430, 437 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997);
Salpietro, 492 B.R. at 638; Davis, 439 BR. at 869-70; In re Braune, 385 B.R. 167, 171 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2008); In re Wetzel, 381 B.R. 247, 251 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); In re Forte, 341 B.R. 859, 864 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2005). Cf In re DeFrehn, No.02-20290, 2003 WL 25273838, at *5 n.8 (Bankr. D. Idaho June 13,
2003) (suggesting that, even if § 1325(b) is not applicable, modification requests by the trustee can be
premised on additional disposable income); In re Fields, 269 B.R. 177, 180 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001) (inter-
preting Sixth Circuit precedent to apply § 1325(b) to modifications proposed by the debtor, but stating
that it is unclear whether § 1325(b) is applicable to trustee-proposed modifications). But cf. In re Louquet,
125 B.R. 267 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991); In re Self, No. 06-40228, 2009 WL 2969489, at *7 (Bankr. D. Kan.
Sept. 11, 2009) (rejecting argument hat trustee cannot propose modification based on increased debtor
income if trustee did not object to original confirmation of plan under § 1325(b)). See generally Keith M.
Lundin & William H. Brown, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY, 4TH EDITION, § 255.1, at ¶ 5, Sec. Rev. June
15, 2004, www.Chl3online.com ("the courts should agree that the disposable income test does not apply
when the proponent of the modification is the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim and the
objecting party is the debtor") (emphasis in original).
3 See In re Peebles, 500 B.R. 270, 276 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2013).
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modified plan as having been proposed "in good faith" under § 1325(a)(3),34
one of the requirements of § 1325(a) that are expressly applicable to plan
modifications under § 1329(b)(1).3s
Conversely, those courts that have held § 1325(b) applicable to chapter
13 plan modifications have generally relied on one or more of five argu-
ments.36 First, they note that the requirements of § 1325(a) are explicitly
applicable to plan modifications, and § 1325(a) begins with the language "Ex-
cept as provided in subsection (b)." Therefore, these courts conclude that the
requirements of § 1325(b) are incorporated by reference into Section 1325(a)
and are equally applicable to plan modifications.37
34See note 7 supra.
35Compare Mattson v., Howe (In re Mattson), 468 BR. 361, 374 (9th Cir. BAP 2012); Kinder v.
Kingry (In re Kingry), No. 05-1126, 2006 WL 6810947, at *7 (9th Cir. BAP Mar. 16, 2006); Germeraad v.
Powell, No. 14-3129, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165920, at *17-18 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2014); Pautin, 521 B.R.
at 763; In re Maxwell, No. 11-17873, 2013 WL 6000455, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013); Grutsch,
453 B.R. at 427; In re Kearney, 439 B.R. 694, 697-98 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2010); In re Savage, 426 B.R. 320
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2010); In re Leon, No. 09-16492, 2010 WL 9478874, at * 5 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Oct. 4,
2010); In re Clevenger, 430 B.R. 539, 543 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009); In re Brown, No. 05-49114,2009 WL
565032, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2009); In re Rither, No. 05-23558, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1278, at *6
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. Apr. 16, 2008) (denying motion to modify) with King v. Robenhorst, No. 11-573, 2011
WL 5877081, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 23, 2011); In re Pasley, 507 B.R 312 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2014); Tibbs,
478 B.R. at 465; Davis, 439 BR. at 869; In re Riddle, 410 B.R. 460, 463-64 (Bankr N.D. Tex. 2009); In re
Nunez, No. 08-21645, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 308 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2009); In re Knighton, No. 07-
71560, 2008 WL 5644891, at * 2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2008); In re McPike, No. 05-30518, 2007 WL
2317420, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 8, 2007); In re Awua, No. 96-10613, 1997 WL 1524800, at *5
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Feb. 24, 1997) (finding modified plan satisfied "good faith" requirement). Cf. In re Midg-
ley, 413 B.R. 820 (Bankr. D. Or. 2009) (considering increase in disposable income as one of many factors in
ruling on modification motion). See generally BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 13:50 (5th ed. rev. Dec.
2014) ("As to the requirement of submission of projected disposable income, the consensus is that the
means test definition of disposable income does not govern a modification but that the good faith require-
ment should be applied to prevent overreaching by any party in connection with a modification"); David
Gray Carlson, Modified Plans of Reorganization and the Basic Chapter 13 Bargain, 83 AM. BANKR. LJ.
585, 616 (Fall 2009) (suggesting that "where § 1325(b)(1) does not apply, good faith means what it meant
before 1984-application of all disposable income to the plan. This is the principle that binds the debtor
to surrender all surplus income in modifications.") (emphasis in original).
Use of the "good faith" requirement to impose a minimum payment requirement in connection with
plan modifications has been strongly criticized by other courts. See, e.g., In re Cormier, 478 B.R. 88, 96
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2012); Heideker, 455 B.R. at 272; In re Keller, 329 B.R. 697, 702-03 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
2005).
16See also In re Heyward, 386 B.R. 919, 922 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008); In re Carey, No. 02-75502, 2004
WL 3623505, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2004); In re Solis, 172 B.R. 530, 532 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994);
In re Flaming, No. 02-03680, 2003 WL 22848925, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 10, 2003) (not specifying
reason for finding Section 1325(b) application to plan modifications). See generally Keith M. Lundin &
William H. Brown, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY, 4TH EDITION, § 255.1, at ¶ 5, Sec. Rev. June 15, 2004,
www.Chl3online.com (stating that the "majority of reported decisions apply the disposable income test at
modification of a confirmed plan, though many do so without comment or analysis").
3 7See, e.g., Meyer v. Tucker (In re Tucker), No. 97-50268, 1997 WL 792979, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23,
1997); In re Williams, No. 09-42400, 2014 WL 274307, at *6 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014); In re Carreiro,
No. 11-17863, 2013 WL 2353784, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 30, 2013); Cormier, 478 B.R. at 95; In re
Heideker, 455 B.R. 263, 269 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Buck, 443 B.R. 463, 469 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2016) THE UNCONFIRMABLE MODIFIED CHAPTER 13 PLAN 439
Second, apart from the introductory language to § 1325(a), § 1325(a)(1)
expressly requires that a chapter 13 plan "complies with the provisions of this
chapter and with the other applicable provisions of this title."38  Because
§ 1325(b) is without question a "provision of chapter 13," a modified plan
must comply with that provision by reason of the applicability of
§ 1325(a)(1).3 9
Third, because § 1329(c)40-which is undoubtedly applicable to plan
modifications-uses the term "applicable commitment period" (defined in
§1325(b)(4)), some courts conclude that Congress must have intended that
§ 1325(b) be applicable to modified chapter 13 plans insofar as it imposes a
durational requirement on chapter 13 plans.41
Fourth, courts note that under § 1329(a), the trustee and a holder of an
allowed unsecured claim are explicitly permitted to seek modification of the
confirmed chapter 13 plan. Moreover, § 521(f requires individual debtors to
file with the court copies of federal income tax returns at the request of the
2010); In re King, 439 B.R. 129, 134 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2010); In re Baxter, 374 B.R. 292, 296 (Bankr. M.D.
Ala. 2007); In re Keller, 329 B.R. 697, 702 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2005); In re Garver, No. 01-71333, 2004
Bankr. LEXIS 2195, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2004); DeFrehn, No. 02-20290, 2003 WL 25273838, at
* 5 & n.7; In re Martin, 232 B.R. 29, 36 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); In re McKinney, 191 B.R. 866, 869
(Bankr. D. Or. 1996).
Some courts that disagree note that § 1322(b) begins with the phrase 'subject to subsections (a) and
(c) of this section," 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b), but § 1329(b)(1) expressly mentions both § 1322(a) and
§ 1322(b), suggesting that Congress was not relying on introductory cross-references to incorporate sub-
stantive provisions. See In re Tibbs, 478 B.R. 458, 464 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012); In re Hall, No. 06-61733,
2008 WL 2388628, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 11, 2008); In re Hill, 386 B.R. 670, 676 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 2008).
311 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) (emphasis supplied).
35See, e.g., In re Stretcher, 466, B.R. 891, 894 (Bankr. W.D Tex. 2011); Buck, 443 B.R. at 469; King,
439 B.R. at 135; In re Quinn, 423 B.R. 454, 465-66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); Braune, 385 B.R. at 670; Baxter,
374 B.R. at 296; Carver, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2195, at *6; Martin, 232 B.R. at 36; In re Klus, 173 B.R. 51,
58 & n.10 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994); In re Powers, 140 B.R. 476, 480 & n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
Those courts that disagree with this analysis argue that interpreting § 1325(a)(1) to make applicable
§ 1325(b) renders most of § 1329(b)(1) superfluous, because the requirement that the modified plan satisfy
the requirements of § 1325(a)(1) (which requires that the plan comply with the provisions of chapter 13)
would already pick up §§ 1322(a), 1322(b) and 1323(c) which are explicitly referenced in § 1329(b)(1).
See, e.g., Lorenzo, 2014 WL 1877408, at *6; Powers, 507 B.R. at 269; Coay, 2012 WL 2319100, at *5;
Grutsch, 453 B.R. at 425; Davis, 439 B.R. at 867-68; King, 439 B.R. at 135; Hill, 386 B.R. at 675; Forbes,
215 B.R. at 191.
4011 U.S.C. § 1329(c) states that a modified plan "may not provide for payments over a period that
expires after the applicable commitment period under section 1325(b)(1)(B) after the time that the first
payment under the original confirmed plan was due, unless the court, for cause, approves a longer period,
but the court may not approve a period that expires after five years after such time."
"See Danielson v. Flores (In re Flores), 735 F.3d 855, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2013) (dictum in case holding
that confirmed plan must satisfy applicable commitment period even if debtor has no projected disposable
income); Buck, 443 B.R. at 469; King, 439 B.R. at 134. Other courts have found the inclusion of the
reference to applicable commitment periods (as defined in § 1325(b)) in § 1329(c) evidence that Congress
intentionally excluded § 1325(b) from other subsections of § 1329. See, e.g., Grutsch, 453 B.R. at 425.
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court, the United States trustee or any party in interest.42 These provisions
indicate that Congress intended to permit the trustee and unsecured credi-
tors to seek upward adjustments of plan payments when projected disposable
income of the debtor increased, a goal that would be frustrated by a conclu-
sion that the provisions of § 1325(b) were not applicable to plan
modifications.43
Finally, courts finding § 1325(b) applicable to chapter 13 plan modifica-
tions have concluded that it would be absurd to require a chapter 13 debtor
to propose and confirm a plan that is required to comply with § 1325(b), and
then allow the same debtor to turn around and propose to modify that con-
firmed plan in a way that does not comply with § 1325(b).44 In other words,
although the actual amount of projected disposable income may change, the
requirement that all projected disposable income to be received by the debtor
in the applicable commitment period is one that cannot be modified.45 Other-
wise, a debtor could do indirectly what it could not do directly -propose a
chapter 13 plan that does not meet the disposable income test-and would
thereby contravene both statutory language and the intent of Congress in
enacting that test.
Although statutory language is generally determinative in interpreting a
statute46 where that language is ambiguous, or leads to absurd results, it is
appropriate to look at the legislative history to aid in interpretation.47 The
conflicting interpretations of § 1329 necessarily demonstrate the absence of
clear statutory language and, therefore, invite a review of the legislative his-
tory of §§ 1325(b) and 1329 by the courts in their determination of whether
Congress intended § 1325(b) to apply to chapter 13 plan modifications.
4211 U.S.C. § 521(f).
45See, e.g., Barbosa v. Solomon, 235 F.3d 31, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2000); Williams, 2014 WL 274307, at *7;
Cornier, 478 B.R. at 97; Heideker, 455 B.R. at 270-71; King, 439 B.R. at 136; In re Self, No. 06-40228,
2009 WL 2969489, at *5 (Bankr. D. Kan. Sept. 11, 2009).
"See, e.g., Cormier, 478 B.R. at 97; Heideker, 455 BR. at 271; In re Rhymaun, No. 11-20092, 2011 WL
9378787, at *3 n.8 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2011); King, 439 B.R. at 135; In re Demske, 372 B.R. 85, 88
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); In re Nahat, 315 B.R. 368, 377 & n.15 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004). Courts that
conclude § 1325(b) is not applicable to modifications believe that an effort to circumvent the projected
disposable income test through modification would be rejected as failing the "good faith" test of
§ 1325(a)(3). See, e.g., Neidich v. Lorenzo (In re Lorenzo), No. 13-23100, 2014 WL 1877408, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. May 9, 2014); In re Fridley, 380 BR. 538, 543 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007); In re Hall, No.06-61733, 2008
WL 2388628, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 11, 2008).
"Demske, 372 B.R. at 88 & n.3.
46See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v Union
Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000); U.S. v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1988).
47See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm'r, 705 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2013); Limited, Inc. v. C.I.R., 286 F.3d 324, 332
(6th Cit. 2002).
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II. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY-
ORIGINAL INTENT AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Chapter 13 was included in the 1978 Code in order to provide an alter-
native to a chapter 7 liquidation that would allow debtors to repay more of
their debts over several years than creditors would receive from the debtors'
non-exempt property surrendered to a trustee.48 However, the new provi-
sions required the court to confirm a chapter 13 plan if it provided for distri-
butions to unsecured creditors with a present value not less than the amount
that would have been paid such creditors under a chapter 7 liquidation on
the effective date of the plan (that is, if the plan met the so-called "best
interests test").49 Because most chapter 7 debtors had few, if any, nonexempt
assets that could be liquidated to pay unsecured creditors, no distributions
under a chapter 13 plan were necessary to meet the best interests test.
Therefore, debtors proposed such "no distribution" chapter 13 plans and their
creditors would receive no additional payments on account of their claims.
Some bankruptcy courts50 considered such plans not to be proposed "in good
faith" and, therefore, not confirmable under § 1325(a)(3).51 However, most
appellate courts found no basis in the statutory language of § 1325 for requir-
ing any minimum payment out of future earnings of chapter 13 debtors in
excess of those payments required by the best interests test.52
Because of creditor dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of chapter 13
in encouraging greater payments on unsecured claims than required by the
best interests test, and the confusion over whether "no distribution" plans
were confirmable, Congress began to consider various methods of modifying
chapter 13 to impose a higher burden for confirmation. The earliest proposal
was introduced by the Senate Judiciary Committee as an amendment to a bill,
S. 658, that was intended merely to make technical amendments to the re-
cently-enacted Code and proposed no substantive changes to § 1325.53 The
"See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5963, 6079.
' 9See Section 1325(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978) (requiring that 'the value,
as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed
unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor
were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date").
50See, e.g., Tenney v. Terry (In re Terry), 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980); In re Hurdle, 11 BR. 304
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); In re Dant, 9 B.R. 117 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); In re Aalto, 8 B.R. 157 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Heard, 6 BR. 876 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980); In re Cook, 3 B.R. 480 (Bankr. S.D. W.
Va. 1980); In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346 (Bankr. SD. W. Va. 1980); In re lacovoni, 2 B.R. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah
1980).
"Section 1325(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978) required that 'the plan has
been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law" in order to be confirmed.
52See, e.g., U.S. v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982); Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968
(4th Cir. 1982); Goeb v. Heid (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982).
"S. 658, 96th Cong., 2nd Seas. (Mar. 14, 1979).
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new provision proposed to amend § 1325(a)(3) to require not only that a
chapter 13 plan be proposed in good faith, but also that it "is the debtor's
best effort."54 The Senate Report provides that the new language was in-
tended to make "clear that the court should determine that the payments in
the plan proposed by the debtor are the greatest that the debtor can reasona-
bly pay so that the liberal provisions allowing composition plans in Chapter
13 will not be abused by debtors."ss This "best effort" formulation was bor-
rowed from the language of Section 727(a)(9).56 The amended bill passed the
Senate57 and moved to the House where it was referred to the House Judici-
ary Committee.
When the bill emerged from the House Judiciary committee, the language
of the proposed amendment to § 1325(a)(3) required that a chapter 13 plan
"represent[ ] the debtor's good faith effort" as a condition to confirmation.5
The House Report described the amendment as follows:5
This amendment clarifies that the character of perform-
ance by the debtor envisioned by a chapter 13 proceeding is
that the plan will provide payments to creditors consistent
with the debtor's ability after account is taken of monthly
budgeted personal and family needs. This provision will re-
quire the court to determine . . . that the proposed plan con-
templates a "good-faith" effort by the debtor in terms of the
promised future payments as measured by the ability of the
debtor to make such payments.
The "good-faith effort" test incorporates as a separate
prerequisite to the confirmation of a chapter 13 plan the re-
quirement that the aggregate payments proposed under the
plan represent a good-faith effort on the part of the debtor to
satisfy the claims of creditors during the pendency of the
plan consistent with the ability of the debtor to make pay-
ments under a chapter 13 plan. In short, the "good-faith ef-
4*S. 658, § 188, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (reported out of Senate Committee on the Judiciary on August
3, 1979 (legislative day June 21, 1979)).
s5S. REP. No. 305, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 14 (August 3, 1979 (legislative day June 21, 1979)).
'
6
Id. Section 727(a)(9XB) allows a chapter 13 debtor to obtain a discharge without paying all of his or
her allowed unsecured claims if the debtor pays at least seventy percent of those claims and "the plan was
proposed by the debtor in good faith, and was the debtor's best effort").
sSee CONG. REC. S12172-12187 (Sept. 7, 1979).
58S. 658, § 128(b), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (reported out of House Committee on the Judiciary on July
25, 1980).
'9H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 24 (July 25, 1980).
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fort" test looks to the present and future ability of the
debtor to make payments into the chapter 13 creditors' fund
during the course of the plan ....
The House approved the revised version of the bill,60 and thereafter the
Senate approved the revised version, with some additional amendments, in-
cluding one which changed the proposed "good faith" amendment to
§ 1325(a)(3) to one inserted in § 1325(a)(4), requiring that the plan represent
the debtor's "bona fide effort."61 In discussing the Senate modification, Sena-
tor DeConcini (Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee) noted that the new
language was attempting to create a compromise between the "good faith"
test of the House and the "best efforts" test of the Senate.62 He described the
new "bona fide" standard as requiring "not only a sincere good faith effort by
the debtor but also one that proposes payments to the creditors that re-
present a significant percentage if not all of the debts owed."63 Elaborating
on the policy underlying the new requirement, Sen. DeConcini continued as
follows:
The "bona fide effort" requirement is responsive to the
widespread concern amount creditors and judges alike that
the provisions of Chapter 13 as enacted inadvertently per-
mitted plans to be confirmed that proposed little or no pay-
ments to unsecured creditors. This is contrary to the
historical spirit and intent of Chapter 13 which was to af-
ford the debtor the protection of the bankruptcy court while
the debtor worked out a plan to repay his creditors over a
period of years out of his future earnings. Thus, Chapter 13
is a remedy for the individual with cash-flow problems while
Chapter 7 would be available for the debtor who simply had
no present or foreseeable prospects of paying his debts at all.
Under the new law, too often instead of meaningful pay-
ments to unsecured creditors, the norm has become 'zero" or
nominal payment plans in many jurisdictions. In other areas,
judges have had to strain the provisions of Section 1325 by
decision or informal rule to reach the right result vis-a-vis
the level of payments of the debtor for the particular case.
Many courts have construed the good-faith language,
oSee CONG. REC. H9290-9306 (Sept. 22, 1980).
6 1See S. 658, § 128(b), CONG. REC. S15170 (Dec. 1, 1980).
6 2See CONG. REC. S15175 (Dec. 1, 1980).
63Id.
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
Section 1325(a)(3) to this end, which was not intended by
Congress in the enactment of that requirement ... 64
The House approved the revised version of the bill, but made further
changes (none of which changed the "bona fide effort" standard).65 The Sen-
ate then reintroduced the bill reflecting the version recently passed by the
House with some additional amendments (again, none of which changed the
"bona fide effort" standard for chapter 13 confirmations)66 and passed its re-
vised version.67 The legislative session expired without the House taking
action on the revised bill.
Early in the next legislative session, a new bill was introduced in the
Senate, identical to the version that died in the last session and including the
"bona fide effort" standard in a proposed amendment to § 1325(a)(4).6 8 The
Senate Judiciary Committee issued a new report on the bill, 69 including the
identical language to describe the proposed amendments to § 1325(a)(4) used
by Senator DeConcini when introducing the Committee's final amendments
to S. 658 on the Senate floor the prior year.70 An amended version of the bill
again passed the Senate.7 1
Meanwhile, bills were introduced in both the Senate7 2 and House of Rep-
resentatives73 that proposed to modify § 1325(a) in two ways. First, a con-
firmed plan would have to represent the debtor's "bona fide effort which is
consistent with the debtor's ability to repay his debts, after providing sup-
port for himself and his dependents."74 Second, the bills proposed to insert a
new requirement for confirmation that the chapter 13 plan either extend for
a period of five years or provide for payment of at least seventy percent of all
allowed unsecured claims.75 A subsequent bill introduced in the Senate76 by
Senator Dole also endorsed the modified "bona fide effort" amendment to
Section 1325(a)(3),77 but his proposed new version of Section 1325(a)(6)
would require that the plan extend for five years or provide "for payments of
64
d.
6 See S. 658, § 127(a), CONG. REC. H11735 (Dec. 3, 1980).
66S. 3259, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Dec. 9, 1980 (legislative day Nov. 20, 1980)).
67See CONG. REC. S15943-45 (Dec. 9, 1980 (legislative day Nov. 20, 1980)).
68S 863, 97th Cong., ist Sess. (Apr. 2, 1981 (legislative day Feb. 16, 1981)).
69S REP. No. 150, 97th Cong., ist Sess. (July 10, 1981 (legislative day July 8, 1981)).
701d. at 18. See text at note 64 supra.
71
CONG. REC. 87893-7907 (July 17, 1981).
72S. 992, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 10, 1981 (legislative day, Feb. 16, 1981)).
73H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 20, 1981).
74H.R. 4786, § 19(a), proposed inserting the 'bona fide effort" test in § 1325(a)(3). S. 992, § 3(a), did
not specify in which subsection of § 1325(a) the insertion was to be made.
71S. 992, at § 3(b)(2); H.R. 4786, at § 19(4).
76S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 16, 1981 (legislative day, Nov. 30, 1981)).
771d. at § 18(a).
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a reasonable portion of all allowed unsecured claims."78 An amended version
of this latter bill was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee with
the language on chapter 13 plan confirmation unchanged from the original
bill.79 In describing the need for the new provisions, the Committee stated:
A chapter 13 proceeding involves substantial benefits to
the debtor who is able to retain his property, avoid most
nondischargeable debts, and cram down debts of secured
creditors. The quid pro quo for such benefits would seem to
be a substantial effort by the debtor to pay his debts. Of
course, the first criterion in such cases must be the debtor's
obligations to support himself and his family. But beyond
that, it is necessary to have a definite standard delineating
how much of the debtor's future income should be commit-
ted to the plan.
It is the intent of Congress to require the debtor to make
a substantial effort to pay his debts. Such an effort may re-
quire sacrifices and some reduction in consumption. Thus,
subsection (a) of the amendment, which adds new language
to subparagraph 1325(a)(3), requires the debtor to devote
that portion of his income which is not necessary for the
support the debtor and his family to the plan. ...
Finally, the amendment (in subsection (d)) would require
the plan to last for a period of 5 years, or to pay a reasonable
portion of allowed unsecured claims. What a reasonable por-
tion of allowed unsecured claims is will be determined on a
case-by-case basis . . . . In general, and excluding hardship
circumstances, a debtor should contemplate the repayment
of at least 70 percent of the allowed unsecured claims for a
proposed plan that has a duration of no more than 3 years,
unless the repayment of that percentage of such claims
would be unfeasible even if the plan were to extend over a
greater period of time.80
Meanwhile, the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
78Id. at § 18(d).
7'S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (May 27, 1981 (legislative day May 25, 1981)).
BId. at 32, 46.
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the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives was holding
oversight hearings on the operation of chapter 13 in October 1981 and
March-June 1982. The first witness before the Subcommittee was Prof.
Vern Countryman of Harvard Law School, who spoke in his capacity as Vice
Chairman of the National Bankruptcy Conference.8' Professor Countryman
addressed several proposals to amend the provisions of chapter 13, including
those aimed at preventing no-distribution plans.8 2 He agreed with those leg-
islators who had opined that the requirement for confirmation that a plan be
proposed "in good faith"8 3 was not intended to impose a quantitative test on
distributions. However, he found the proposed "bona fide effort" test to be
"vague[ ]" and likely to engender "confusion."8 4 He further criticized those
bills that would add a new confirmation requirement that every plan either
pay at least 70 percent to unsecured creditors or have a five-year duration.85
Instead, Professor Countryman offered a proposal from the National
Bankruptcy Conference that would accomplish two goals. First, it would
impose a new condition to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan that could be
invoked by any unsecured creditor, forcing the debtor to devote all of his or
her projected disposable income to the plan.8 6 The statutory language sub-
mitted by the National Bankruptcy Conference in this regard would add a
new clause (c) to Section 1325 as follows:
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the
court may not confirm a plan over a timely objection by the
holder of an allowed unsecured claim, unless the payments to
be made under the plan total at least
(1) an amount equal to 100 percent of allowed claims; or
(2) the debtor's total projected disposable income
during the three-year period commencing on the date the
debtor's first payment under the plan is due.
(d) The court may not deny confirmation of a plan under
subsection (a)(3) of this section on a ground relating to the
amount of the payments to be made under the plan.7
The proposed statutory language would also include a definition for "dis-
posable income" in a new § 1320 as "all earnings and other income not rea-
"Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., on Personal Bankruptcy
(Oct. 22, 1981; March 23, 25, Apr. 28, May 20, and June 16, 1982), at 2.
21d. at 6.
811l U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).





2016) THE UNCONFIRMABLE MODIFIED CHAPTER 13 PLAN 447
sonably necessary (a) for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor and, (b) if the debtor is engaged in business, for payment of actual
expenses incurred in operating the business."88
The second goal of the National Bankruptcy Conference proposal was to
ensure that plans could be modified to reflect subsequent changes in the
debtor's income, whether favorable or unfavorable, which may result in "an
inadequate commitment of his disposable income under the plan."89 It was
the view of the National Bankruptcy Conference that, 'in exchange for the
advantages of chapter 13 over chapter 7, the debtor should commit this dis-
posable income for the term of the plan."90 Therefore Professor Countryman
submitted proposed language that:
will permit the debtor to seek a modification of the plan, in
the event of a reduction in income, but it will also permit an
unsecured creditor, in the event of an improvement in the
debtor's income position at any time during the period of the
plan, to seek a modification so that the full amount of the
debtor's disposable income as it then is, remains committed to
payments under the plan.91
This goal would be accomplished by adding a new paragraph (d) to
§ 1329 which would read as follows:
(d) On request of the debtor or of a creditor holding an
allowed unsecured claim and after notice and a hearing, the
plan shall be modified under subsection (a) of this section to
any extent that any change in the debtor's total projected
disposable income, as defined in section 1320 of this title,
substantially affects whether the plan, before modification,
complies with the conditions specified in sections 1325(a)(6)
and 1325(c) of this title.92
Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr of the District of Maine, Chair of the
Committee on Chapter 13 of the National Bankruptcy Conference, also testi-
fied in support of the proposal.93 Judge Cyr emphasized that the second ob-
jective of the proposal was to make the "ability-to-pay standard . .. applicable
to plan modifications following confirmation . . . ."94
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ing to enact revisions to the Code in response to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.95 finding
unconstitutional the provisions of the Code that conferred Article III juris-
diction on non-Article III bankruptcy judges. In one of the bills proposed to
address that issue, Representative Butler included the proposals of the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Conference with respect to ability-to-pay under chapter
13.96 The bill proposed to insert language at the beginning of § 1325(a) that
states, "Except as provided in subsection (b)," redesignate the current subsec-
tion (b) as subsection (c), and enact a new subsection (b) that included both
the projected disposable income test proposed by the National Bankruptcy
Conference, and the definition of "disposable income," as follows:
(b)(1) If the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects
to the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not ap-
prove the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan-
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the
plan on account of such claim is not less than the amount of
such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected
disposable income to be received in the three-year period be-
ginning on the date that the first payment is due under the
plan be applied to make payments under the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, "disposable income"
means income which is received by the debtor and which is
not reasonably necessary to be expended-
(A) for the support of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor; or
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment
of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation,
and operation of the business.97
The bill also proposed amending § 1329 on postconfirmation modifica-
tions to add a new subsection (b) which was substantively the same as that
proposed by the National Bankruptcy Conference:
(b)(1) At any time after confirmation, but before the
completion of payments under the plan, the plan shall be
modified, at the request of the holder of an allowed un-
secured claim, and after notice and a hearing, to the extent
that any change in the debtor's anticipated disposable in-
9'458 U.S. 50 (1982).
"H.R. 7294, 97th Cong, 2d Sess. (Oct. 1, 1982).
9 7 d. at § 315.
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come causes the plan to fail to satisfy both of the require-
ments specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section
1325(b)(1) of this title. The plan as modified becomes the
plan.
(2) In paragraph (1) of this subsection, "disposable in-
come" shall have the meaning given it in section 1325(b)(2)
of this title.98
If adopted, § 1329(a) would have remained the provision pursuant to
which a debtor could seek modification of a confirmed plan,99 and the lan-
guage of § 1329(b)(1) would become a new § 1329(c) and would apply to
modifications sought both by debtors and unsecured creditors.00 Represen-
tative Butler introduced a revised version of his bill two months later'01 in
which the ability-to-pay proposal was modified by removing the definition of
"disposable income" from § 1325(b) and by requiring that the disposable in-
come test be met if any "party in interest" (not just a holder of an unsecured
claim) objected to confirmation of the chapter 13 plan.102 The proposed
amendments to § 1329 did not change, other than the deletion of the former
reference to the definition of "disposable income" in § 1325(b)(2).0 3  Both
bills died at the end of the legislative session without any action being taken
on them.
Early in the new session, Representative Rodino, the Chair of both the
House Committee on the Judiciary and its Subcommittee on Monopolies and
Commercial Law, introduced a new bill in the House, and Senators Metzen-
baum and Kennedy introduced an identical bill in the Senate, which closely
95Id. at § 316(d).
11d. at § 316(a).
"Id. at § 316(c).
01H.R. 7349, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 2, 1982).
1
02Id. at § 315.
1
3oId. at § 316. Although there is no way to determine why the definition of "disposable income" was
deleted, both H.R. 7294 and H.R. 7349 included a new definition of "anticipated disposable income" to be
inserted in § 101 which would read as follows:
(3) "anticipated disposable income" means-
(A) income that the debtor has, at the time of the commencement of the case, a
reasonable expectation of receiving for the foreseeable future; less
(B) expenditures that, at the time of the commencement of the case, are reasona-
bly necessary to support the debtor and the debtor's dependents, and to operate
any business of the debtor;
Perhaps in making the revisions included in H.R. 7349, someone erroneously believed that the definition of
"disposable income" in § 1325(b) was unnecessary in light of the definition of "anticipated disposable
income" that was already included. However, the proposed language of § 1325(b) and § 1329 did not use
the term "anticipated disposable income," nor would that term (which is determined as of the commence-
ment of the case) be appropriate in those contexts.
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tracked the proposal of the National Bankruptcy Conference.104 Unlike the
revised bill of Representative Butler, these bills restored the definition of
"disposable income" in § 1325(b), and allowed only holders of allowed un-
secured claims to trigger application of the disposable income test by ob-
jecting to the plan.'0 Both bills also proposed to insert a new subparagraph
(d) in § 1329 that would read as follows:
(d) On request of the debtor, the trustee, or a creditor
holding an allowed unsecured claim and after notice and a
hearing, the plan shall be modified under subsection (a) of
this section to any extent that any change in the debtor's
anticipated disposable income substantially affects whether
the plan, before modification, complies with the require-
ments specified in section 1325(a)(6) and section 1325(b) of
this title.1o6
Shortly thereafter, Senator Dole introduced another bill which followed
the approach in the bill he had previously introduced in 1981107 by seeking to
amend § 1325(a)(3) to require that a chapter 13 plan "represent[ ] a bona
fide effort which is consistent with the debtor's ability to repay his debts,
after providing support for himself and his dependents"sos and insert a new
§ 1325(a)(6) which would preclude confirmation of a chapter 13 plan unless
they either had a duration of five years or "provide[ ] for payments of a
reasonable portion of all allowed unsecured claims."'09 The bill also proposed
an amendment to § 1325(a)(4) to require that a chapter 13 plan "presents the
debtor's bona fide effort,""10 although that provision was struck before the
bill emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee."' The Senate Report
accompanying the bill1 12 contained identical language describing the proposed
amendments to § 1325(a) as that included in the Senate Report accompany-
104H.R. 1147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 1, 1983); S. 333, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 1, 1983 (legisla-
tive day Jan. 25, 1983)).
10 H.R. 1147 at § 10; S. 333 at § 10.
'06H.R. 1147 at §12; S. 333 at § 12.
107S. 2000, 97th Cong., ist Sess. §19 (Dec 16, 1981 (legislative day Nov. 30, 1981)).
losS. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §220 (Feb. 3, 1983 (legislative day Jan. 25, 1983)).
'9Id. § 220. The word 'payments" was changed to "payment" in the Senate Judiciary Committee. A
bill with identical language for proposed amendments to § 1325(a) was introduced in the House a month
later. H.R. 1800, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 120 (March 2, 1983). Two other bills were introduced in the
House during the same period, both of which proposed the same amendment o § 1325(aX3) as S. 445, but
requiring that a chapter 13 plan either have a duration of five years or provide "for payments of at least 70
per centum of all allowed unsecured claims." HR 1169, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19 (Feb. 2, 1983); H.R.
3205, 98th Cong., Ist Ses. § 19 (June 2, 1983).
"Old. §430(b).
IlS. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 430 (April 26, 1983)
1
12S. Rept. No. 98-65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 220 (April 26, 1983).
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ing the 1981 bill.' 13 The bill passed the Senate on April 27, 1983,114 and
thereafter was referred to the House Judiciary Committee and the House
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service."1
While the Senate was considering the Dole bill, the House of Representa-
tives deadlocked over the Marathon problem, unable to reach a compromise
between those who sought Article III status for bankruptcy judges and those
who were opposed to that approach. Representative Rodino introduced a
bill that coupled giving bankruptcy judges Article III status with provisions
that might induce opponents to that approach to accept a compromise, in-
cluding changes to the requirements for a chapter 13 plan. Under H.R.
5174,116 § 1325(a) would be amended to insert that language "Except as pro-
vided in subsection (b)" at the beginning of the subsection and a new subsec-
tion (b) would be adopted that would read as follows:
(b)(1) If the trustee or the holder of an allowed un-
secured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan, then
the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective
date of the plan-
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the
plan on account of such claim is not less than the amount of
such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected
disposable income to be received in the three-year period be-
ginning on the date that the first payment is due under the
plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, 'disposable income'
means income which is received by the debtor and which is
not reasonably necessary to be expended-
(A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor; or
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment
of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation,
and operation of such business.""7
With only very minor changes, this language is identical to that included
in the bill introduced by Representative Butler shortly after the conclusion of
the oversight hearings."8 However, instead of inserting a new subsection to
'
13
See text at note 80 supra.
"'129 CONG. REc. S5383-88 (April 27, 1983).
"sS. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 5, 1983).
" 6H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2nd Ses. (March 19, 1984).
" 71d. at §217.
"sSee text at notes 96-100 supra.
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permit holders of allowed unsecured claims to move to modify a confirmed
chapter 13 plan, the bill proposed an amendment o the existing provisions of
§ 1329(a) to make clear that modifications of chapter 13 plans could be made
"upon request of the debtor, the trustee, or the holder of an allowed un-
secured claim."" 9 No amendment to § 1329(b) was proposed as part of this
new bill.
After approving an amendment o the bill to eliminate conferring Article
III status on bankruptcy judges and instead adopting the approach already
adopted by the Senate that would designate bankruptcy judges as "adjuncts"
of the district court, the House passed the bill.1 2 0 The Senate passed the bill
with amendments,121 none of which affected the provisions of § 1325 or
§ 1329. The Conference Committee resolved the remaining differences be-
tween House and Senate, but in that process made no changes to the lan-
guage of the bill with respect to § 1325 or § 1329.122 The Conference
Report was approved by both Housel2 3 and Senate,124 and was signed into
law by the President on July 10, 1984.125
Section 1325(b) was amended in a minor respect in 1986 to change the
word "or" between the clauses of § 1325(b)(2)(A) and § 1325(b)(2)(B) to
"and."126 In 1998, Congress amended § 1325(b)(2)(A) to exclude from the
term "disposable income" amounts reasonably necessary to be expended for
certain charitable contributions.127
When Congress amended the Code in 2005,128 it substantially rewrote
§ 1325. First, it added three new confirmation requirements for a chapter 13
plan, set forth in § 1325(a)(7), (8) and (9),129 and significantly modified the
required treatment of secured claims under a plan.130 Second, in a section of
the statute titled "Chapter 13 Plans to Have a 5-Year Duration in Certain
Cases," it modified § 1322(d) (which had previously limited the duration of a
chapter 13 plan to three years unless the court, for cause approved a longer
"'H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 219 (March 19, 1984).
120130 CONG. REc. H1796-1854 (March 21, 1984).
121130 CONG. REc. S7617-25 (June 19, 1984).
"'Conf. Rept. No. 98-882, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 26-27 (June 29, 1984).
123130 CoNG. REc. H7499-7500 Uune 29, 1084).
124130 CONG. REc. S8887-8900 (June 29, 1984).
125Pub. L. No. 98-353 Uuly 10, 1984).
1
2 6 Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 283(y) (Oct. 27, 1986), 100 Stat. 3118.
127Pub. L. No. 105-183, § 4(a) (June 19, 1998), 112 Stat. 518. Charitable contributions that qualify
for exclusion from disposable income are those "that meet the definition of 'charitable contribution' under
section 548(dX3)" that are made "to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization" and that do
.not exceed 15 percent of gross income of the debtor for the year in which the contributions are made."
1
2 8Bankruptcy Amendments and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), Pub. L. No. 109-8,
Title I, § 102(h)(2) (Apr. 20, 2005), 119 Stat. 33.
1
29
1d. § 102(g)(3), § 213(10), and § 716(a).
o30 ld. § 306.
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period not to exceed five years131) and replaced the requirement in
§ 1325(b)(1)(B) that all the debtor's projected isposable income to be re-
ceived in the three-year period beginning on the date that the first plan pay-
ment is due be devoted to paying unsecured claims with a requirement that
all projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment
period beginning on such date be so paid.132 It also defined the term "applica-
ble commitment period" (used in the newly-amended § 1325(b)(1)(B)) to
mean either three years, or (if the debtor was an above-median debtor) five
years, or less than those periods, but only if the plan "provides for payment in
full of all allowed unsecured claims over a shorter period."133
Congress also changed the definition of "disposable income" so that the
computation begins not with "income which is received by the debtor" but
with "current monthly income received by the debtor (other than child sup-
port payments, foster care payments, or disability payments for a dependent
child made in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law to the extent
reasonably necessary to be expended for such child)."134 The term "current
monthly income" was added as a new definition that generally looks to the
average monthly income of the debtor for the six months ending on the last
day of the calendar month preceding the bankruptcy filing.135 Finally, in a
section of the legislation that Congress labelled "Applicability of Means Test
to Chapter 13," it specified that the portion of that income "reasonably neces-
sary to be expended" for maintenance or support of the debtor or debtor's
dependents and continuation, preservation and operation of a business within
the meaning of § 1325(b)(2) was to be determined in accordance with the
means-testing provisions of H§ 707(b)(2)(A) and (B) if the debtor was an
above-median debtor.136
Section 1329(c) was modified in a consistent fashion, changing the lan-
guage that previously limited a modified plan to three years to language that
limited the duration of a modified play to "the applicable commitment period
under § 1325(b)(1)(B)."1 37 Section 1329(a) was also amended to permit mod-
1'"Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1322(c), 92 Stat. 2648 (Nov. 6, 1978).
132Id. § 318(2).
1 33Id. § 318(3).
I341d. § 318(2).
"11 U.S.C. § 1o1(1oA).
13
6BAPCPA, § 102(h)(2). The test of whether a debtor is "above-median" is whether "the debtor has
current monthly income, when multiplied by 12, greater than-(A) in the case of a debtor in a household
of 1 person, the median family income of the applicable State for 1 earner; (B) in the case of a debtor in a
household of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, the highest median family income for the applicable State for a family of
the same number or fewer individuals; or (C) in the case of a debtor in a household exceeding 4 individuals,
the highest median family income of the applicable State for a family of 4 or fewer individuals, plus $525
per month for each individual in excess of 4." Id. The $525 figure is subject to adjustment every three
years under 11 U.S.C. § 104, and is currently $625.
1"Id. § 318(4).
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ifications of chapter 13 plans to reduce amounts required to be paid under the
plan by certain amounts expended by debtors to purchase health insur-
ance.'38  No changes were made to § 1329(b).
III. WHAT WE LEARN FROM THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
INTERPRETING § 1329
When Congress enacted the Code in 1978, it required that chapter 13
plans comply with three requirements set out in § 1322(a).139 Section
1322(b) provided ten additional provisions that could be included in a chap-
ter 13 plan, but none of these was mandatory.140 The only other provision
included in § 1322 was § 1322(c) which limited the length of a chapter 13




"Section 1322(a), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978), provided:
(a) The plan shall-
(1) provide for the submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other
future income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is
necessary for the execution of the plan;
(2) provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments of all claims entitled
to priority under section 507 of this title, unless the holder of a particular claim
agrees to a different treatment of such claim; and
(3) if the plan classifies claims, provide the same treatment for each claim within
a particular class.
140Section 1322(b), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978) stated:
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may-
(1) designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided in section 1122 of
this title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated;
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only
by a security interest In real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or
of holders of unsecured claims;
(3) provide for the curing or waiving of any default;
(4) provide for payments on any unsecured claim to be made concurrently with
payments on any secured claim or any unsecured claim;
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the curing of
any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case
is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is
due after the date on which the final payments under the plan is due;
(6) provide for the payment of all or any part of any claim allowed under section
1305 of this title;
(7) provide for the assumption or rejection of any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor not previously rejected under section 365 of this
title;
(8) provide for the payment of all or any part of a claim against the debtor from
property of the estate or property of the debtor;
(9) provide for the vesting of property of the estate, on confirmation of the plan
or at a later time in the debtor or in any other entity; and
(10) include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with this title.
2016) THE UNCONFIRMABLE MODIFIED CHAPTER 13 PLAN 455
the court may not approve a period that is longer than five years."141 Any
modification of the plan prior to confirmation had to "meet the requirements
of section 1322 of this title,"142 meaning that it had to include the mandatory
provisions set forth in § 1322(a), could include the permissive provisions set
forth in § 1322(b), but could not exceed the length prescribed by § 1322(c).
All six confirmation requirements were set forth in § 1325(a).143 Section
1325(b) in its original form did not have anything to do with confirmation.
Instead, it allowed the court, after confirmation of the plan, to "order any
entity from whom the debtor receives income to pay all or any part of such
income to the trustee."144
It is against this statutory background that one must interpret the Con-
gressional intent behind the provisions governing post-confirmation modifica-
tion of a chapter 13 plan in § 1329. Section 1329(a) originally allowed for
modification of a chapter 13 plan to accomplish only three purposes: increas-
ing or reducing payments, extending or reducing the time for payments, or
altering the amount of payments to reflect payments made outside of the
plan.145 Because (1) the introductory language was phrased in a passive voice
'41Section 1322(c), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978).
"'Section 1323, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978).
143
The court was directed to confirm a plan under § 1325(a), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov.
6, 1978), if:
(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with other applicable
provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or by the plan,
to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by
law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under
the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount
that would be paid on such claim in the estate of the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan -
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such
claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of such claim is not less than allowed amount of
such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with
the plan.
1'Section 1325(b), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978).
4sSection 1329(a), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978) stated as follows:
(a) At any time after confirmation but before the completion of payments under a
plan, the plan may be modified to-
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class
provided for by the plan;
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("the plan may be modified") and (2) under § 1321 only a debtor may propose
a chapter 13 plan, § 1329(a) was interpreted to allow only the debtor to
modify a confirmed plan.146
If the debtor sought to modify a plan, under § 1329(b)(1), the modifica-
tion had to comply with "Sections 1322(a), 1322(b), and 1323(c) of this title
and the requirements of section 1325(a) of this title."47 Then, as now,
§ 1323(c) dealt with the treatment of secured creditors who had previously
accepted or rejected the original chapter 13 plan and allowed them to change
their views if the modification changed their rights.148 But, at this time,
§§ 1322(a) and 1322(b) were the exclusive provisions governing the contents
of a chapter 13 plan, other than the limit on plan length, covered by
§ 1322(c). Section 1329(b)(1) did not mention § 1322(c) because § 1329(c)
contained its own limitation on plan length applicable to a modified plan,'14
to avoid any suggestion that by modifying the plan the debtor could "start
over" with a new three years (or potentially extend the payments beyond
five years). Therefore, § 1329 required that a modified plan comply with all
provisions relating to the contents of an original plan under § 1322. The
legislative history of § 1329 explicitly endorses this interpretation.1 0
In addition, at the time § 1329(b)(1) was enacted, § 1325(a) was the sole
section of the Code that provided requirements for confirmation of a chapter
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments; or
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is provided for
by the plan, to the extent necessary to take account of any payment of such claim
other than under the plan.
"'See Barbosa v. Solomon, 235 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir. 2000); In re Anderson, Nos. 587-03218, 587-
03236, 1989 WL 222971, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 1989); In re Nelson, 27 BR. 341, 345 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1983). See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 1329.01[1][b], at 1329-5 (Lawrence P.
King, ed., 15th ed. 1996); 5 William L. Norton, Jr., BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 124:2, p. 124-10
(2d ed. 2007).
'47Section 1329(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978).
148Section 1323(c), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978), provided:
(c) Any holder of a secured claim that has accepted or rejected the plan is deemed
to have accepted or rejected, as the case may be, the plan as modified, unless the
modification provides for a change in the rights of such holder form what such
rights were under the plan before modification, and such holder changes such
holder's previous acceptance or rejection.
149Section 1329(c), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (Nov. 6, 1978), provided:
(c) A plan modified under this section may not provide for payments over a period
that expires after three years after the time that the first payment under the origi-
nal confirmed plan was due, unless the court, for cause approves a longer period, but
the court may not approve a period that expires after five years after such time.
'See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 143, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5929 ("A modified plan [under Section 1329] may not contain any provision which could not be
included in an original plan as prescribed by section 1322."); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 431,
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6387 (Subsection (b) specifies that the normal provi-
sions governing plan and preconfirmation modification apply to postconfirmation modification.").
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13 plan. Congress did not "exclude" § 1325(b) from the list of provisions
applicable to a modified plan when it drafted § 1329(b)(1) because there was
no § 1325(b) that could have been applicable at the time.151 In specifying
that § 1325(a) applies to a modification to a chapter 13 plan, Congress was
stating in § 1329(b)(1) that a modified chapter 13 plan must satisfy all the
confirmation requirements applicable to the original chapter 13 plan. Again,
the legislative history is consistent with this view.152
The language of §§ 1329 and 1325 when they were enacted in 1978
demonstrates that Congress intended a modified chapter 13 plan contain all
the provisions, and satisfy all the requirements, necessary for confirmation.
Consequently, the current language of those sections should not be inter-
preted to embrace a different philosophy unless the history of the amend-
ments made to those sections establishes that Congress clearly and
unequivocally expressed that it no longer wished modifications of chapter 13
plans to meet the same requirements as the original confirmed plan. The
history of the amendments to §§ 1325 and 1329 does not provide any evi-
dence of a change in approach. In fact, the history of the amendments to
those sections suggests that, to the contrary, Congress intended that all chap-
ter 13 plans satisfy the new disposable income test, and, if the debtor's pro-
jected disposable income increased, unsecured creditors should be able to
move to modify the plan to capture that additional income.
If we begin with the conclusion that § 1329(b)(1) originally required that
a modified plan comply with all requirements for confirmation, the question is
whether Congress intended to exclude the disposable income test from the
requirements for modification of a plan when that test was later incorporated
in § 1325(b). Because Congress never amended § 1329(b)(1) to express any
such intent explicitly (as, for example, by adding words like "but not Section
1325(b)" in its text), its intent could only be inferred from its failure to
amend § 1329(b)(1) to add an explicit reference to § 1325(b) as a condition
to modification of a chapter 13 plan. There are two points in time when such
an amendment might have been contemplated: when § 1325(b) was enacted
in 1984, and when both §§ 1325(b) and 1329 were amended in 2005. The
legislative history of those amendments demonstrates that at neither time did
Congress intend to change the basic understanding of § 1329(b)(1) that re-
quired that all conditions to confirmation be satisfied for modified chapter 13
plans.
As described in Part II above, almost all of the early bills that proposed to
effectuate an "ability-to-pay" requirement for a chapter 13 plan imposed the
"' 1See discussion at note 144 supra.
"'See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 431, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6387 (discussing application of § 1325(a)(4) to "confirmation of a modified plan").
458 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
new requirement as a part of § 1325(a), either as a gloss on the "good faith"
standard of § 1325(a)(3) or in addition to the "best efforts" test of
§ 1325(a)(4). Because those new tests were to be part of § 1325(a), it was
unnecessary to consider amending § 1329(b)(1), which already expressly ref-
erenced § 1325(a).
Later Congressional proposals changed from requiring the debtor's "best
effort" or a -good faith effort" to pay his or her debts to an objective standard
requiring devotion of all his or her "disposable income" to that payment.
Only then did the new requirement (with its related definition) appear in a
separate subsection of § 1325, § 1325(b). The decision to move the require-
ment from § 1325(a) to a new § 1325(b) was probably motivated by drafting
convenience (attempting to include both the substantive requirement and the
definition of "disposable income" in a clause of § 1325(a) would have been
cumbersome) rather than by some substantive judgment about plan
modifications.
When the new § 1325(b) was proposed, the interdependence of the two
subsections of § 1325 was apparent from its structure. Subsections (a) and
(b) were never mutually exclusive provisions; although it would be possible
to obtain confirmation of a chapter 13 plan by compliance with § 1325(a)
alone, it would never be possible to confirm a plan under § 1325(b) without
also complying with § 1325(a). In other words, § 1325(b) was intended to
set forth an additional requirement for confirmation of a plan whenever the
trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objected to confirmation,
not an alternative method of confirmation, and therefore it was always inte-
gral to the confirmation requirements of § 1325(a). This is why the intro-
ductory language to § 1325(a) was modified to include the phrase "[e]xcept
as provided in subsection (b)" to the directive mandating confirmation upon
satisfaction of the § 1325(a) requirements. This is also why no explicit refer-
ence to § 1325(b) in § 1329(b)(1) was necessary as a drafting matter.
Although some of the bills that included a new § 1325(b) did include a
proposed amendment to § 1329 that would explicitly allow the holder of an
unsecured claim to seek modification of a confirmed chapter 13 plan to apply
the new disposable income requirement,153 none of those bills passed either
chamber. Instead, the Senate passed a bill that modified § 1325(a)(3) to re-
quire that a chapter 13 plan "represents a bona fide effort which is consistent
with the debtor's ability to repay his debts, after providing support for him-
self and his dependents"154 and added a new § 1325(a)(6) to mandate a five-
year term unless it "provide[d] for payments of a reasonable portion of all
'"See discussion at note 99-106 supra.
"4 S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §220 (Feb. 3, 1983 (legislative day Jan. 25, 1983)).
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allowed unsecured claims."'" Because the bill proposed to modify only
§ 1325, no change to § 1329(b)(1) was necessary to ensure that the ability-
to-pay test would be applicable to modifications.
In the final negotiations aimed at resolving the Constitutional crisis cre-
ated by Marathon, the House passed a bill that included the disposable in-
come test in a separate subsection, § 1325(b), rather than including a new
paragraph in § 1329(b) as the prior bills had provided. The bill also included
an amendment to § 1329(a) to allow the trustee or a holder of an allowed
unsecured claim to move for modification to a confirmed chapter 13 plan.
The linkage of those two amendments strongly suggests that the purpose
behind a motion to amend from the trustee or an unsecured creditor would
be to compel a debtor to devote increased disposable income to the plan.
This is the version that was passed by the Senate as well and became law in
1984.
Obviously, if Congress had amended § 1329(b)(1) to include § 1325(b) in
the listed provisions applicable to plan modifications, its intent would have
been clear. However, the failure of Congress to amend the preexisting
§ 1329(b)(1) to include newly-enacted § 1325(b) should not be read in the
same way as would failure to include the provision if § 1329(b)(1) were being
drafted for the first time contemporaneously with the drafting of § 1325(b).
There is nothing in the legislative history that indicates that Congress affirm-
atively rejected the idea of including § 1325(b) in § 1329(b)(1), as some
courts have intimated.156 Indeed, most scholars believe that the failure to
include the new provision was a drafting error because the policy reasons for
imposing the disposable income test were equally applicable to plan
modifications.'s?
'Id. § 220. The word "payments" was changed to "payment" in the Senate Judiciary Committee. A
bill with identical language for proposed amendments to § 1325(a) was introduced in the House a month
later. H.R. 1800, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 120 (Mar. 2, 1983). Two other bills were introduced in the
House during the same period, both of which proposed the same amendment o § 1325(a)(3) as S. 445, but
requiring that a chapter 13 plan either have a duration of five years or provide "for payments of at least 70
per centum of all allowed unsecured claims." H.R. 1169, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19 (Feb. 2, 1983); H.R.
3205, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19 (June 2, 1983).
'"See, e.g., Neidich v. Lorenzo (In re Lorenzo), No. 13-23100, 2014 WL 1877408, at *4 n.3 (S.D. Fla.
May 9, 2014) (Congress "chose not to amend these four provisions upon the addition of § 1325(b) to the
Code in 1984") and at *5 ("It could have expressly provided that § 1325(b) applies as well, but it chose
not to").
"7See Keith M. Lundin & William H. Brown, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY, 4TH EDITION, § 255.1, at
¶ 9, Sec. Rev. June 15, 2004, www.Chl3online.com ("Policy arguments support application of § 1325(b)
at modification after confirmation"); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1329.01[3][c], at 1329-9 (Lawrence
P. King, ed. 15th ed. 1996) ("[I]f the trustee or the holder of an unsecured claim objects to a modification
proposed by the debtor, then the ability-too-pay test of section 1325(b) must probably be satisfied as
well."); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 1329.01[3][c] at 1329-9 n.43a (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th ed.
1996) ("The omission of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) from the list in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1) was probably legisla-
tive oversight. It is hard to imagine that Congress, having decided to impose the ability-to-pay test, would
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Of course, Congress had the opportunity to rectify that error when it
amended both § 1325(b) and § 1329 in 2005. As discussed in Part 11,158
Congress amended § 1325(b) to replace the three-year period in the disposa-
ble income test with the concept of the 'applicable commitment period,"
which was also defined in that section the duration of which depended on
whether the debtor was an above-median debtor or not. Congress also cir-
cumscribed judicial discretion by providing a definition of the debtor's "dis-
posable income" based on his or her "current monthly income,"159 a term
which is defined as the average monthly income received during the six
months prior to the bankruptcy filing.o60 At the same time Congress
amended § 1329 to add subsection (a)(4), allowing modification of a chapter
13 plan in certain circumstances to reduce amounts to be paid under the plan
by the amount actually expended by the debtor to purchase health insur-
ance.161 Congress did not amend § 1329(b), which some courts interpret to
mean that Congress was embracing the omission of § 1325(b) from the modi-
fication requirements.162
However, Congress may have declined to add § 1325(b) to § 1329(b)(1)
because Congress believed that such a reference was not necessary. This
view is bolstered by the amendment that Congress did make in the 2005
amendments to the comparable provision in chapter 12, § 1229.163
As is true for a chapter 13 plan, a court is directed to confirm a chapter
12 plan if it complies with the requirements of § 1225(a) "[e]xcept as pro-
vided in subsection (b)."1 6 4 Section 1225(b)(1) provides that, "[i]f the trustee
or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the
plan," the court may not confirm the plan unless the disposable income test is
not also impose it as to plan modifications."); 5 William L. Norton, Jr., BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE
§ 124:2, p. 124-18 (2d ed. 2007) ("The failure to include Code § 1325(b) in the list of sections applicable
to postconfirmation modification under Code § 1329(b) is probably legislative oversight."). Cf. 8 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1229.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, eds., 16th ed. 2015) (stating that the
omission of § 1225(b) from § 1229(b)(1) "was probably unintentional as it is unlikely that Congress in-
tended the requirement to apply to the initial confirmation of a plan but not to confirmation of a modified
plan"). But see 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1329.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, eds., 16th
ed. 2015) ("having had the opportunity to provide that section 1325(b) applies in all respects to modifica-
tions, Congress chose not to do so.").
IssSee discussion at notes 131-133 supra.
1511 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2).
1 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A).
16111 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(4).
162See, e.g., In re Niday, 498 B.R. 83, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2013) ('perhaps it is worthy of note that the
[2005] legislation did amend § 1329 by adding subsection (a)(4) dealing with health insurance expendi-
tures [without amending § 1329(b)]"); In re White, 411 B.R. 268, 273 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2008) ("when
presented with the opportunity to add the reference to § 1325(b) in § 1329(b) with BAPCPA, Congress
declined to do so").
1611 U.S.C. § 1229.
'611 U.S.C. § 1225(a).
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satisfied.16 5 Unlike for chapter 13, the definition of "disposable income" for
chapter 12 was not amended to refer to "current monthly income" of the
debtor, but instead means "income which is received by the debtor and which
is not reasonably necessary to be expended" for maintenance or support of
the debtor and the debtor's dependents, or for the operation of the debtor's
business. 166
In language that was modeled on § 1329(b)(1), § 1229(b)(1) states that
"Sections 1222(a), 1222(b), and 1223(c) of this title and the requirements of
section 1225(a) of this title apply to any modification under subsection (a) of
this section."167 There is no reference to § 1225(b), which contains the dis-
posable income test applicable to a chapter 12 plan upon objection by the
trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim.
In 2005, Congress did not amend § 1229(b)(1) either. However, it did
amend § 1229(d) to bar modification of a chapter 12 plan "by anyone except
the debtor, based on an increase in the debtor's disposable income, to increase
the amount of payments to unsecured creditors required for a particular
month so that the aggregate of such payments exceeds the debtor's disposable
income for such month."s68 If the trustee or the holder of an unsecured claim
were not permitted to seek modification of a chapter 12 plan based on an
increase in debtor's disposable income, there would have been no need for
such an amendment. And, if the trustee or the holder of an allowed un-
secured claim can seek a chapter 12 plan modification based on increased
disposable income, certainly one would argue that the trustee or such a
holder can seek a chapter 13 plan modification under the parallel language of
Section 1329(a).
It is important to note that, even if Congress did not explicitly include
§ 1325(b) in the list of provisions applicable to chapter 13 plan modifications
in § 1329(b)(1), neither did it exclude that provision. Section 1329(b)(1)
does not purport to make §§ 1322(a), 1322(b), and 1323(c) and the require-
ments of § 1325(a) the sole provisions that apply to a modification under
§ 1329(a) (to the exclusion of all others); it simply states that those provi-
sions apply. It is thus unlikely that Congress intended, when it subsequently
added additional requirements for the content of a chapter 13 plan, that those
requirements would not also apply to modified plans.
For example in 1994 Congress added subsection (e) to § 1322, requiring
that, if a chapter 13 plan proposes to cure any default, the amount necessary
to effectuate such a cure "be determined in accordance with the underlying
16111 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).
'611 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
6711 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1).
16811 U.S.C. § 1229(d)(2), added by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1006(b), 119 Stat 23 (Apr. 20, 2005).
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agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law."169 In the 2005 amendments
to the Code, Congress inserted a new subsection (f) in § 1322, forbidding a
plan from "materially alter[ing] the terms of a loan [from a pension plan or
thrift savings plan]."o7 0 Certainly no one would suggest that a court could
approve a modified chapter 13 plan that either provided a different computa-
tion of a cure amount from that specified in § 1322(e), or which purported to
materially alter a pension plan loan in violation of § 1322(f). If a court were
to seek authority precluding such a modification, the court would undoubt-
edly point to § 1329(b)(1) and its inclusion of § 1325(a)(1) which requires
that the plan comply "with the provisions of this chapter [13]." The same
authority bars a modification that violates § 1325(b).
IV. LANNING AND THE UNCONFIRMABLE PLAN
MODIFICATION
If the legislative history strongly supports the view that Congress in-
tended the disposable income test to apply throughout the life of a chapter 13
plan, and the statutory language can be read to reflect that view (albeit, not
with the clarity one might wish), why do most courts reject that interpreta-
tion and conclude that the disposable income test is not applicable to plan
modifications? I suggest that the rejection of the disposable income test in
the context of plan modifications, in large part, reflects hostility towards the
constraints of the means-testing provisions of the 2005 amendments.
As discussed above,' 7 ' in 1984 Congress first required that, if the trustee
or a holder of an allowed unsecured claim objected to confirmation of a chap-
ter 13 plan, the plan must provide for dedication of the all the debtor's "pro-
jected disposable income" to be received in the three years following the first
date on which plan payments were to be made.172 "Disposable income" was
defined as "income which is received by the debtor and which is not reasona-
bly necessary to be expended" for debtor's maintenance or support or for
business expenditures.17 3 This formulation not only permitted courts to con-
firm plans when the debtor's anticipated income or expenses varied from his-
torical patterns, but also allowed courts considerable latitude to take into
account changes in anticipated income and expenses over the life of a plan
when modifications were sought.
The 2005 amendments stripped the bankruptcy courts of much of this
discretion, by redefining "disposable income" to mean "current monthly in-
come received by the debtor" with certain exclusions, "less amounts reasona-
'6911 U.S.C. § 1322(e), added by Pub. L. No. 103-394, §305(c), 108 Stat. 4106 (Oct. 22, 1994).
17011 U.S.C. § 1322(f, added by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 224(d), 119 Stat. 23 (Apr. 20, 2005).
'
7
'See discussion at notes 116-125 supra.
'72Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 317(3), 98 Stat. 333 (July 10, 1984).
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bly necessary to be expended" for maintenance or support or certain
charitable contributions or business expenses.174 The new definition created
two problems. First, the reference to "current monthly income" in the defini-
tion-a new term that was defined to mean the average monthly income of
the debtor derived during the six-month period prior to the bankruptcy fil-
ing' 75-meant that the income figure used to compute projected disposable
income had no necessary relationship either to the actual income the debtor
was receiving at the time the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection or to the
income which the debtor anticipated receiving during the life of the chapter
13 plan.176 Second, for an above-median debtor, Congress also required use of
the means-testing provisions of § 707(b)(2) in determining which expenses
were "reasonably necessary" for debtor's maintenance or support, 77 which
don't necessarily reflect the expenses actually being incurred by the debtor at
the time of filing, or anticipated to be incurred by the debtor during the
following five years (the applicable commitment period for an above-median
debtor).
The harshness of these make-believe figures was exacerbated by those
courts that concluded, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hamilton v.
Lanning,178 that "projected disposable income" was to be determined by tak-
ing the "disposable income" figure so-computed, and simply multiplying it by
the applicable commitment period for the debtor, three or five years.'79 As
the Supreme Court noted in Lanning, this approach would produce "senseless
results" when the "debtor's disposable income during the 6-month look-back
period is either substantially lower or higher than the debtor's disposable
income during the plan period." 80 It is, therefore, not surprising that courts
overwhelmingly concluded, prior to Lanning, that when a debtor sought
modification of a chapter 13 plan based on changed circumstances the court
should look at the debtor's actual income and expenses at the time of the
proposed modification, rather than the historical figures used to confirm the
plan, thereby rejecting application of the projected disposable income test of
§ 1325(b).'8 '
17411 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2).
1711 U.S.C. § 101(10A).
1'
7 As noted by Judge Lundin, "there is a crucial disconnect between the debtor's ability to pay credi-
tors and the amount the debtor will be required to pay to satisfy the tests for confirmation after
BAPCPA.... [I]t will now be true in many more chapter 13 cases that the actual financial circumstances
of the debtor will not be accurately reflected in the strange mathematics of confirmation." Keith M.
Lundin & William H. Brown, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY, 4TH EDITION, § 506.1, at ¶ 17, ¶ 20, Sec. Rev.
Mar. 29, 2006, www.Chl3online.com.
17711 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3).
178560 U.S. 505 (2010).
'79 See, e.g., Maney v. Kagenveama (In re Kagenveama), 541 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2008).
'soHamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 520 (2010).
1
1See, e.g., In re McCully, 398 B.R. 590 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008); In re Hill, 386 B.R. 670 (Bankr. S.D.
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The Supreme Court in Lanning rejected this mathematical computation
of 'projected disposable income" in favor of an adjustment of current monthly
income for changes in income or expenses that were "known or virtually cer-
tain at the time of confirmation."182 The logical import of this holding is that
a court could consider the debtor's actual income and expenses at the time of
a proposed plan modification, because those would be "known or virtually
certain" at that time.'83 However, by the time the Supreme Court clarified
the protected disposable income test, many courts had already held that the
disposable income test was inapplicable to chapter 13 plan modifications.
Most courts that have found § 1325(b) inapplicable to chapter 13 plan
modifications do, in fact, consider changes in debtor's disposable income in
making their decision whether to approve or disapprove a proposed modified
plan. They do so either by incorporating that factor as part of their analysis
of whether the plan satisfies the -good faith" requirement of § 1325(a)(3), or
the "best efforts" requirement of § 1325(a)(4), or just as a consideration that
bears on whether they should exercise their discretion in approving a pro-
posed modification under § 1329(a).184
The reason for the enactment of § 1325(b) was that Congress did not
wish the debtor's ability to pay to be subsumed into the confirmation re-
quirements of § 1325(a). To return to that discredited approach for approval
of plan modifications is contrary to the basic premise of the 1984
amendments.185
More fundamentally, Congress never intended that a modified chapter 13
plan be one that could not have been confirmed in the first instance. Despite
the assertions of those courts that distinguish between a "confirmation" and a
"modification" of a plan,186 most courts have recognized that "[m]odification
of a plan is essentially a new confirmation."'87 More important, the Code
Ohio 2008); In re Ewers, 366 BR. 139 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007); In re Howell, No. 07-80365, 2007 WL
4124476 (Bankr. W.D. La. Nov. 19, 2007).
1821d. at 524.
'8 See In re Prieto, No. 08-3308, 2010 WL 3959610, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2010) (inter-
preting Lanning to evidence "the intent under Chapter 13 to determine a debtor's actual income and
expenses during the life of his chapter 13 plan for purposes of establishing his plan payments" and granting
trustee's motion to modify). One of the leading bankruptcy treatises has failed to recognize the signifi-
cance of Lanning in interpreting § 1329(b) when it suggests that "section 1325(b) is not one of the provi-
sions incorporated in section 1329(b), and could not be in light of the amendment o 1325(b) which
requires the use of the debtor's prepetition income amounts to determine plan payments." 8 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1329.05 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer et al., eds., 16th ed. 2015) (emphasis
supplied).
" 4See cases cited in note 35 supra.
"ssCf Carlson, supra note 35, 83 AM. BANKR. LJ. at 618 (characterizing the requirement that debtor
devote surplus disposable income to pay creditors as "grounded in the basic chapter 13 bargain" after the
1984 amendments).
'"See cases cited in note 26 supra.
'5 Ledford v. Brown 219 BR. 191, 194 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998); see also In re Tagliarini, No. 02-19446,
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itself characterizes a modification of a chapter 13 plan under § 1329 as a
confirmation in § 1330(b), which provides that, if the court revokes an order
of confirmation the court must either covert or dismiss the case under § 1307
unless "the debtor proposes and the court confirms a modification of the plan
under section 1329 of this title."'88 The Code also characterizes a chapter 12
plan modification as a 'confirmation" in § 1230(b).189
An approved chapter 13 modification that is not confirmable is an oxy-
moron. Thus, it is time for bankruptcy courts to apply § 1325(b)-as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in Lanning-to plan modifications.
2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3172, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 2005). Cf Harry L. Deffebach, Postconfirma-
tion Modification of Chapter 13 Plans: A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing, 9 BANKR. DEv. J. 153, 155 (1992)
(stating that, '[i]f modification is permissible, the court should apply the same standards used in confirm-
ing the original plan.").
'511 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (emphasis supplied).
"'91 U.S.C. § 1230(b).
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